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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STEPHEN CURRIER, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
TAMARA HOLDEN, WARDEN, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
Case No. 920467-CA 
CARL McCLELLAN, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
TAMARA HOLDEN, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
Case No. 930123-CA 
APPELLEE'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
1. Does the Utah Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to 
declare a statute unconstitutional? 
2. Has this Court misapprehended the nature and scope of 
the "writ of habeas corpus" protected by article I, sections 5 of 
the Utah Constitution, thereby erroneously determining that the 
open courts provision has been violated and incorrectly 
subjecting Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992) to a heightened 
level of constitutional scrutiny, refusing to presume the 
statute's constitutionality, and shifting to Appellee Holden the 
burden of proving the statute's reasonableness? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
For purposes of this petition, Appellee Holden accepts the 
statement of facts set forth by this Court in pages 2-5 of its 
opinion of September 17, 1993, in these consolidated cases. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Only a majority of the five members of the Utah Supreme 
Court has constitutional authority to declare state laws 
unconstitutional. Because the Utah Court of Appeals lacks such 
jurisdiction, this Court should withdraw its opinion striking 
down Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992) as violative of the open 
courts provision, Utah Const, art. I, section 11, and certify 
these cases to the Utah Supreme Court for decision. 
In reaching its conclusion that section 78-12-31.1 is 
facially unconstitutional because it transgresses the open courts 
clause, this Court has misapplied Utah Supreme Court precedent 
and erroneously interpreted the open courts provision as 
protecting a post-conviction remedy for appellants that is not 
guaranteed by article I, section 5 of the Utah Constitution. The 
"privilege of the writ of habeas corpus" protected by article I, 
section 5 of the Utah Constitution since 1896 is a remedy only 
for one who claims the restraining authority acted without 
jurisdiction; the writ of habeas protected by article I, section 
5 is simply not available to challenge a conviction by a court of 
competent jurisdiction. Thus, article I section 5 does not 
protect from suspension appellants' remedy under rule 65B(b) for 
collaterally challenging their convictions by way of a petition 
for an extraordinary writ. 
Because the statute of limitations in section 78-12-31.1 
2 
does not impinge on any remedy available to appellants through a 
writ of habeas corpus as that term is used in article I# section 
5, this provision does not create a constitutionally protected 
civil remedy for appellants. Thus, there is no violation of the 
open courts clause to trigger heightened constitutional scrutiny, 
negate the presumption of the statute's validity, and shift the 
burden onto the State to demonstrate the statute's 
reasonableness. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO DECLARE A 
STATE LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THAT POWER IS 
GRANTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ONLY TO THREE OR MORE JUSTICES OF THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT. 
Article VIII, section 2 of the Utah Constitution allows the 
Utah Supreme Court to sit "either en banc or in divisions." It 
goes on to state that the Utah Supreme Court "shall not declare 
any law unconstitutional . . . except on the concurrence of a 
majority of all justices of the Supreme Court." This provision 
vests exclusive jurisdiction in at least three of the five 
members of the Utah Supreme Court, a constitutionally created 
court, to declare a statute unconstitutional. Even if article 
VIII, section 2 were generously interpreted as not barring a 
majority of the judges of the Utah Court of Appeals (i.e., four 
of seven) from declaring a statute unconstitutional, such is an 
impossibility since the Utah Court of Appeals, a statutorily 
created court, cannot sit en banc. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(2) 
(1992). In any event, in these consolidated cases, only two 
3 
judges of the Utah Court of Appeals have struck down the statute 
of limitations contained in section 78-12-31.1. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(g) (1992) vests the Utah 
Supreme Court with jurisdiction over a judgment of "any court of 
record holding a statute . . . unconstitutional on its 
face . . . ." However, the jurisdictional statute for the Court 
of Appeals, Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1992), contains no similar 
provision.1 As this Court has itself observed, "the 
jurisdictional limits of a statutorily created court . . . are 
circumscribed by its empowering legislation." Thompson v. 
Jenkins, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah App. 1987). Only the Utah 
Supreme Court, constitutionally created to be co-equal with the 
state legislature, possesses such rank. Therefore, article VIII, 
section 2 sensibly restricts declarations of a statute's 
unconstitutionality to be a power enjoyed only by a majority of 
the Utah Supreme Court's five members. 
In short, although the Utah Court of Appeals can affirm the 
constitutionality of a statute in its appellate review of a lower 
court judgment, once a majority of a panel of the Utah Court of 
Appeals Court determines that the challenged statute is 
*Even if a majority of a three-member panel of the Utah Court 
of Appeals could hold a statute unconstitutional where no other 
court of record had yet so held, such a holding might not be fully 
binding. As a matter of "res judicata," or claim preclusion, such 
a holding could be binding as to the particular case. However, 
unless certiorari were granted by the Utah Supreme Court, a matter 
of discretion under rule 46, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and 
the panel ruling upheld, the question of the statute's 
constitutionality might be subject to relitigation in subsequent 
cases: that is, there would be no "collateral estoppel," or issue 
preclusion. 
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constitutionally infirm, the Court lacks jurisdiction2 to 
declare the statute unconstitutional and, therefore, must 
transfer the case to the Utah Supreme Court for an authoritative, 
binding ruling. 
II. THIS COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT ARTICLE 
I, SECTION 5 PROVIDES APPELLANTS A 
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED REMEDY FOR 
CHALLENGING THE LEGALITY OF THEIR CONVICTIONS 
BY A COURT WITH PROPER JURISDICTION. 
A majority of this Court refused to apply the normal 
presumption of section 78-12-31.1's constitutionality based on 
its conclusion that appellants have, under article I, section 5, 
a state constitutional right to collaterally attack their 
convictions by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a 
civil remedy protected from legislative infringement by the open 
courts provision, Utah Const, art. I, § 11. Currier v. Holden, 
No. 920467-CA, slip op. at 9, 12-13 (Utah App. August 17, 1993). 
This erroneous conclusion, which has no support in the common law 
or state constitutional history, forms the requisite premise for 
the majority's heightened scrutiny of the challenged statute 
2
 Although this jurisdictional claim was not raised in these 
consolidated cases, it has heretofore been raised to this Court by 
state appellees (and at least one appellant) in several other 
cases--including one involving the constitutionality of section 78-
12-31.1 two of which are still pending before this Court: Gibson 
v. Board of Pardons, No. 920211-CA, Memorandum of Appellant in 
Support of Motion to Transfer (May 25, 1993 order denied motion 
that was based on Utah Court of Appeals' lack of jurisdiction to 
declare Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 unconstitutional); State v. 
Ranael, No. 920802-CA, Brief of Appellee at 21; State v. Chapman, 
No. 910529-CA, Brief of Appellee at 18; In re D.A.A.. No. 920258-
CA, Brief of Appellee at 11-13; State v. Tavsom, No. 920838-CA 
(State's motion, currently pending, to transfer case involving 
constitutionality of commissioner statute ). 
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through the mode of analysis set out in Berrv ex rel. Berry v. 
Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). 
Since 1896, article I, section 5 of the Utah Constitution 
has provided: "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall 
not be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the 
public safety requires it." This limitation on legislative power 
undeniably protects the right to petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus from suspension except in narrow circumstances. However, 
at the time this provision was written and adopted the term "writ 
of habeas corpus" had a specific and very limited meaning within 
the common law; accordingly, the right to a civil remedy 
protected by article I, section 5 is itself limited. 
As understood at common law, at the time article I, section 
5 was written, and by the Utah Supreme Court shortly thereafter, 
the only question a court reviewed on a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus was whether the petitioner was being restrained of 
his liberty by authority of a governmental entity, usually a 
court, that had jurisdiction. Areson v. Pincock, 62 Utah 527, 
530, 220 P. 503 (1923); Winnovich v. Emerv, 33 Utah 345, 93 P. 
988, 993-94 (1908); In re Clark. 28 Utah 268, 78 P. 475 (1904); 
Ex parte Havs. 15 Utah 77, 47 P. 612, 613-14 (1897); In re 
Mauahan. 6 Utah 167, 21 P. 1088, 1089 (1889); see also Hurst v. 
Cook, 777 P. 2d 1029, 1034 (Utah 1989) (recognizing that the 
purpose of the habeas corpus writ at common law was limited to 
challenging jurisdiction); see generally D. Oaks, Legal History 
in the High Court--Habeas Corpus, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 451, 468 
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(1966). 
In a series of cases over the last fifteen years, Utah 
appellate courts have used the term "writ of habeas corpus" to 
describe the procedural vehicles now provided for in rule 65B, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for raising various types of 
claims for "extraordinary relief" that could not be raised in a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus at common law. E.g., Hurst. 
Ill P.2d at 1033-34 (post-conviction relief); Wickham v. Fisher, 
629 P.2d 896 (Utah 1981) (conditions of confinement); Ziealer v. 
Milliken. 583 P.2d 1175 (Utah 1978) (violation of "basic 
rights"); Hatch v. DeLand, 790 P.2d 49 (Utah App. 1990) (alleged 
violation of petitioner's substantial constitutional rights by 
Board of Pardons). 
Nonetheless, the "writ of habeas corpus" to which article I, 
section 5 of the Utah Constitution refers is the limited writ 
available at common law at the time the provision was drafted, 
not the expanded remedies now available to petitioners for post-
conviction relief (and others) through rule 65B, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure.3 
Several other state courts have recently addressed and 
rejected challenges to a statute of limitations on petitions for 
post-conviction relief based on a purported violation of state 
3
"It can scarcely be doubted that the writ [of habeas corpus] 
protected by the suspension clause [, U.S. Const, art. I, § 9,] is 
the writ as known to the framers, not as Congress may have chosen 
to expand it or, more pertinently, as the Supreme Court has 
interpreted what Congress did." Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence 
Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments. 38 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 142, 170 (1970). 
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constitutional anti-suspension provisions like Utah's article I, 
section 5. Five months ago, the en banc Supreme Court of 
Washington upheld a one-year statute o£ limitations on petitions 
collaterally attacking criminal convictions. In re Petition of 
Runvan, 121 Wash. 2d 432, 853 P.2d 424 (1993). The court 
rejected the claim that the statute violated the state 
constitutional anti-suspension clause, which is exactly the same 
as Utah's. The court reasoned that the narrow scope of the 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus at the time of the 
constitutional enactment--i.e., the right only to test the 
restraining court's jurisdiction to detain the petitioner-
defined the privilege protected by the state constitution's anti-
suspension clause. Id. at 429-30. 
In Potts v. State, 833 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Term. 1992), the 
Tennessee court likewise recognized that the common law "writ of 
habeas corpus" protected from suspension by the state 
constitution did not encompass petitions for post-conviction 
relief. Therefore, a statute of limitations on such petitions 
did not violate the anti-suspension clause. Id. 
Based on its misapprehension of the nature and scope of the 
writ of habeas corpus at common law, a majority of this Court has 
incorrectly interpreted article I, section 5 as giving appellants 
a constitutionally protected remedy for collaterally attacking 
their convictions by courts of competent jurisdiction. 
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III. WITHOUT THE PREDICATE REMEDY PROTECTED BY 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 5, THERE IS NO OPEN COURTS 
VIOLATION AND, THUSf NO BASIS FOR THIS COURT 
EITHER TO PRESUME SECTION 78-12-31.1 IS 
FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL OR TO SHIFT THE 
BURDEN OF DEMONSTRATING THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATION'S REASONABLENESS TO APPELLEE. 
As a result of the majority's incorrect conclusion that 
article I, section 5 gives appellants a constitutionally 
guaranteed civil remedy protected from infringement by the open 
courts clause, the balance of the majority's constitutional 
analysis and scrutiny of section 78-12-31.1 is hopelessly flawed. 
Absent an infringement of a remedy that is constitutionally 
protected by the open courts provision, it is inappropriate to 
apply the stringent two-part test set out in Berrv ex rel. Berry 
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) to assess 
section 78-12-31.1. See Condemarin v. University Hosp.. 775 P.2d 
348, 363, 368, 372 (Utah 1989) (three justices agree infringement 
on remedy protected by Utah Constitution's open courts provision 
shifts burden of proving statute's constitutionality onto 
proponent of statute's validity). 
Instead, since article I, section 5 does not guarantee 
appellants a post-conviction remedy, the strong presumption of 
constitutionality nomnally accorded statutes should have provided 
the starting point for the majority's constitutional analysis. 
E.g., Mountain State Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Garfield County. 811 P.2d 
184, 187 (Utah 1991). Furthermore, the majority should have 
imposed on appellants the heavy burden of proving--through 
evidence presented in the trial courts and not through counsel's 
9 
representations at oral argument--that the statute of limitations 
is facially unconstitutional. See Greenwood v. Citv of North 
Salt Lake. 817 P.2d 816# 819 (Utah 1991); Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (1989). 
Because the majority's opinion is based on a faulty premise 
that seriously misapprehends the nature and scope of the writ of 
habeas corpus at common law and as used by the drafters of 
article I, section 5, this Court should withdraw its opinion of 
September 20, 1993 and grant a rehearing. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellee Holden requests that 
this Court grant rehearing and 
a) withdraw its opinion of September 17, 1993, and certify 
these cases to the Utah Supreme Court for decision; or 
b) withdraw its opinion and issue a new opinion after any 
rebriefing or reargument deemed necessary. 
Counsel for Appellee Holden certifies that this petition is 
filed in good faith and not for purposes of delay. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of September, 1993. 
TTAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
ANNINA M. MITCHELL (2274) 
ANGELA F. MICKLOS (6229) 
JAMES BEADLES (5250) 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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